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In spite major advances in the theoretical, positive and normative, lit-
erature analysing the welfare implications of public provision of private
goods, empirical investigation is often limited to contingent valuation stud-
ies, mainly for environmental goods. In this paper we argue that when a
market for a (subsidised or free of charge) publicly provided good exists,
a consumer demand approach can be used to construct a money metric of
welfare corresponding to the consumption of public provision. We illustrate
this approach in investigating age and income eﬀects on household demand
for health care in Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and
those entitled to it often resort to private supplementation. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the money metric of welfare, which consumers attach to free
or subsidised access to publicly provided health care, varies substantially
with age and to a lesser extent with household income.
Keywords: public provision, demand analysis, consumer welfare,
JEL classiﬁcation: D1
∗Corresponding author. Department of Economics and Economics Research Centre, Univer-
sity of Cyprus, P. O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. Email: p.pashardes@ucy.ac.cy.
†Economics Research Centre, University of Cyprus. Email: n.pashourtidou@ucy.ac.cy.1 Introduction
A considerable proportion of public funds is channeled into the provision of pri-
vate goods, such as health care and education for which, normally there also exist
private markets. The design of the public provision scheme often allows the eligi-
ble individuals to supplement their consumption with purchases from the private
sector. The purpose of this paper is to explore the case where consumer theory
can be used in order to construct a money metric of the welfare individuals derive
from the consumption of publicly provided private goods, that is estimable by
applying demand analysis to accessible data. We use this approach to investigate
the extent to which consumer welfare from access to free public health care varies
with age and income.
In the literature there are two main strands in analysing the role of public
provision of private goods: positive and normative theories. In positive (voting)
models, public provision of private goods is a political phenomenon induced by
voting (Epple and Romano, 1996; Gouveia, 1996). In normative (welfare) models
public provision is introduced to mitigate market imperfections (such as exclud-
ability, imperfect information, externalities etc.) and, under certain conditions,
is shown to work as a means for income redistribution and eﬃciency enhance-
ment. Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) combine the positive and normative
approaches and establish that eﬃcient public provision of private goods can arise
from politically rational voting, under asymmetric information.
Using the example of medical care, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) prove
that under incomplete information and ration or subsidisation/taxation, eﬃciency
and redistribution can be achieved when self-selection constraints are enforced.
Besley and Coate (1991) rely also on self-selection to demonstrate that universal
public provision of private goods can redistribute income from ‘rich’ to ‘poor’,
when public provision is ﬁnanced by a head tax and its quality matters to the
individuals. The redistributive eﬀects of public provision in the presence of a
private market, where consumers can pay for extra quality, are also analysed in
Ireland (1990). The empirical ﬁndings in this paper conform to the theoretical
arguments above, in the sense that those who beneﬁt from free access to health
care appear to be mostly low income households.
It is worth emphasising that allowing supplementation of public provision with
privately purchased quantities of the same good, as we do in this paper, is nei-
1ther mandatory nor optimal. Besley and Coate (1991), Bergstrom and Blomquist
(1996), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Ireland (1990) carry out the analy-
sis for schemes that prohibit supplementation of public provision, whereas the
system in Boadway and Marchand (1995) allows supplementing. Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998) derive the conditions under which a public provision scheme
should allow or not supplementation. Particularly, in the case of health care, the
coexistence of public and private provision in relation to redistribution when the
quality of health care is represented by waiting time, is analysed by Hoel and
Saether (2003) and Marchand and Schroyen (2005). Iversen (1997) investigates
the eﬀect of private sector on the waiting time for receiving a treatment in the
public sector.
The focus in our analysis is not on how an (optimal) public provision scheme
is decided but rather on what such a scheme, once in place, means to potential
beneﬁciaries, the consumers of the publicly provided good. More speciﬁcally,
we are interested in the welfare implications of public provision as perceived by
the individual household and measured empirically from data readily available in
household expenditure surveys. To our knowledge, previous empirical analysis in
the context of welfare valuation of publicly provided goods is limited to contingent
valuation studies (mainly of environmental goods) and econometric modelling of
willingness to pay, elicited from contingent valuation surveys (see for example
Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Clinch and Murphy, 2001; Hanemann, 1994) or
application of hedonic methods to value air quality (see for example Chay and
Greenstone, 2005; Smith and Huang, 1995).
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o no ft h i sp a p e rl i e si nt h eu s eo fa ni n t e g r a b l ed e m a n ds y s t e m
to evaluate utility from a publicly provided private good and investigate age and
income eﬀects. We consider the latter eﬀects to be important in view of the esca-
lating public expenditure on health care due to population aging and in the light
of arguments for curbing this expenditure by targeting free public provision to
those in need. The role of age and income in consumer demand for health care
has long been recogised in the literature. Grossman (1972) provides a theoret-
ical justiﬁcation for the use of age and income in analysing demand for health,
whereas Besley et al. (1999) study the probability that an individual owns pri-
vate health insurance and ﬁnd that higher household income is associated with
greater probability of purchasing private health insurance. They also ﬁnd that
middle-aged individuals have higher probability of owning private insurance than
individuals in their 30s and over 65, a result reﬂecting heavily on our own empir-
2ical ﬁndings. Other studies demonstrating the importance of income and/or age
on health care include Propper (2000) and Atella et al. (2004). These studies
examine consumers’ behaviour with regard to only one good, health care, hence
no welfare implications can be derived.
In our analysis the beneﬁt of the publicly provided private good is introduced
in the consumer’s optimisation problem as a parameter scaling the market price
(price subsidy) of the private good, along the lines ﬁrst shown by Barten (1964).
The scaling, which can vary with consumer characteristics and other variables re-
ﬂecting the perceived quality of the publicly provided good, gives rise to a measure
of the reduction in total expenditure attributed to public provision. This money
metric of utility from the publicly provided private good can then be estimated
using data from a family expenditure survey and information about the eligibility
of households to public provision, often also available in family expenditure sur-
veys. We illustrate our approach in the case of health care in Cyprus, where the
public provision scheme is not universal and permits supplementation.
Section 2 considers how free of charge (or at reduced cost) public provision of
private goods can be incorporated in a consumer demand system through price
scaling. In section 3 an empirical model is speciﬁe da n dc o m p a r e dw i t has i m p l e r
model, where public provision ‘translates’ consumer demand. Section 4 discusses
the estimation results obtained from the two empirical models. Section 5 analy-
ses the welfare implications of the empirical ﬁndings for households at diﬀerent
incomes and ages of their head. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2C o n s u m e r d e m a n d
We consider utility to be derived from joint consumption of publicly provided and
privately purchased goods, as deﬁned by the utility function
U(q1h + Q1h,....,qnh + Qnh)( i =1 ,2,...,n) (1)
where qih is the quantity of the privately purchased and Qih the quantity of the
publicly provided good consumed by household h. We assume that the consumer
perceives qih and Qih as the same good, diﬀering only in terms of quality and
transforming from one to the other via a linear equation
Qih = θi(zh)qih = θihqih,
3where zh is a vector of household characteristics and θih ∈ (0,∞) a scaling func-
tion indicating how household characteristics aﬀect the perceived quality of the
publicly provided private good. Among the arguments included in zh can be
household characteristics reﬂecting the opportunity cost of consuming the good
in the public instead of the private sector (e.g. the wage rate) or the level of
eligibility and/or take up by household members.
Writing q∗






which is maximised subject to
n P
i=1
piqih ≤ yh,w h e r epi is the price of private





ih ≤ yh,w h e r ep∗
ih = pi/(1 + θih).1



















0,p =( p1,...,p n)
0 and θh =( θ1h,...,θ nh)
0.T h u s t h e
utility and cost2 functions are of the form ﬁrst given by Barten (1964), where
public (free or at reduced charge) supplementation of a private good is introduced
as a price subsidy, i.e. a scaling of the price of the corresponding privately pur-
chased amount of the same good. The price scaling in this case is expected to be
downwards, indicating that the more a household resorts to free of charge con-
sumption of a particular commodity, the lower is the unit cost of this commodity.
We consider the behavioural and welfare implications of the public provision
modelled above assuming that the consumer preferences are described by the











1T h et i m es u b s c r i p tt that can be attached to the variables in this section is omitted for
notational simplicity.
2The relation between pi and θih is dictated by p∗
ih hence C(p,θh,u h) is not any arbitrary





functions with respect to prices, pi for all i. Moreover, ah(p,θh) is homogenous
of degree one in prices, whereas bh(p,θh) and lh(p,θh) are homogenous of degree
zero. uh is the utility of household h. N o t et h a ti n( 2 )t h ed e p e n d e n c yo ft h e
cost function on household characteristics can come through two channels: the
parameters of the cost function and the household speciﬁc price scaling associated
with public provision.
Consumer behaviour, as described by the Marshallian budget share for the





























Once the parameters of (3) are known, welfare from free public provision can be





0,u 0)=C(p,θh,u 0)/C(p,θ0,u 0) (4)
where θ0 is the price scaling corresponding to the reference household, for instance
a household not eligible to free of charge consumption of the publicly provided
private good under consideration. In this case (4) shows the compensation re-
quired by a household entitled to public provision to give up this entitlement, i.e.
attain the same level of utility as a household without entitlement.
Under the quadratic logarithmic form of consumer preferences (4) becomes







and, normally, depends on the utility level of the reference household, u0.T h i ss o
called ‘base dependence’ property is well known to hold true for all measures re-
ﬂecting cost comparisons between households with diﬀerent characteristics (Lew-
bel, 1991) and implies that the magnitude of (5) is a function of some arbitrary
normalisation (non-decreasing transformation) of u0, unless bh(p,θh)=b0(p,θ0)
and lh(p,θh)=l0(p,θ0) for all h.
53 Empirical model
In this section we ﬁrst specify a rank-3 demand system where public provision
enters through the price scalar θh, as described above. The eﬀect of public pro-
vision in this demand system is rather complicated to determine and interpret.
Thus, a simpler model is also considered where public provision is introduced in
an ad hoc manner, known in the literature as translating. It should be noted
here that scaling and translating in our analysis refer to the procedure used in
modelling potential savings associated with public supplementation of private con-
sumption, rather than the costs incurred by additional household members (Pollak
and Wales, 1981).
3.1 Scaling
For the household speciﬁc price indices in (2), the functional form corresponding
to the QL Almost Ideal demand system (Banks et al., 1997) is used to obtain an


































































λih ln(1+θih). Then the Marshallian
budget shares take the form



























λih =0all h for adding up;
P
j
γij =0 ,a l li
for homogeneity; and γij = γji all i,j for symmetry.3
To retain the linearity of
P
j




1,w h e r eξis are parameters capturing the eﬀect of household characteristics Nsh,
relating to the perceived quality of the publicly provided free good. Furthermore,
health care is considered here to be the only publicly supplemented private good in
the demand system, denoted by setting θih =0all i, except i = M. Therefore, and




1. Then, in the absence of price variation, and under the restriction of household
invariance for some of the parameters of the cost function, the demand system (7)
can be written as
wih = αih −γiM
P
s
ξsNsh +βi[lnyh −αh0 −ah(θh)]+λib(θh)[lnyh −αh0 −ah(θh)]
2










Given that without price variation the estimation of θh relies on the interaction
between the level of expenditure, yh, and the household characteristics Nsh,o n l y
af e wξs parameters can be estimated in the demand system above. For this
reason we conﬁne the investigation of the eﬀects of age and income on households
behaviour vis-a-vis the free public health care supplementation by deﬁning ln(θh+




N1s = rh,N 2s = z1hrh,N 3s = z
2
1hrh (7a)
where rh the number of persons in the household entitled to free public health
care and z1h the age of household head; and then as
N1s = rh,N 2s = b yhrh,N 3s = b y
2
hrh (7b)
where b yh is household’s log net income, corrected for various characteristics of
the household (number of children, rooms, cars etc) and its head (age, education,
employment status etc).4 T h et w oa l t e r n a t i v ed e ﬁnitions of θh are compared
empirically by non-nested methods.
3The form of the budget share shows that even if the parameters of the cost function are
restricted to be free of h, violation of ‘independence of base’ can occur through θh appearing in
the coeﬃcient of the quadratic term (Pashardes, 1995).
4Alternative functional forms of φh,i nz1h, such as the linear and expontential were employed
but were statistically dominated by the quadratic in nested and non-nested tests, respectively.
7The share equations are then given by
wih = αih − γiMφh + βi[lnyh − α0h + αMhφh − 0.5γMMφ
2
h] (8)




and estimated for the speciﬁcations of φh given by (7a) and (7b).
Following standard practice in estimating demand systems from individual
household data (e.g. Blundell et al., 1993), the household speciﬁc intercepts of
the budget share equations in (8) are deﬁned as linear functions of observed char-
acteristics of the household, αih = αi +
K P
k=0
αikzkh where zk,k=0 ....K, are the
characteristics of the household (such as the number of children, size of house,
central heating, availability of durables like cars) and its members (such as age,
education, economic position and employment status). The parameter capturing
the subsistence (zero utility) expenditure is deﬁned as α0h = α0 + α01z0h,w h e r e
z0h denotes the number of children in the (two adult) household.5
The interaction of parameters γiM and ξs, s =1 ,2,3 captures commodity sub-
stitution due to access to the publicly supplemented private good. The household
speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r sαMhξs and γMMξsξl,l=1 ,2,3,s h o wt h ei n c o m ee ﬀect of this
supplementation through scaled (Barten-type) prices.
Model estimation is conducted using nonlinear SUR under integrability restric-
tions, which in the case of system (8) become
P
i









λi =0 . Furthermore, the restriction γiM = γ for all i 6= M is imposed
in estimation.
3.2 Translating
When public provision is introduced by translating the demand system, the quadratic






where ah(),b h() and lh() a r ea sd e ﬁned in subsection 3.1, Nh =[ N1h, ...,N Sh] is a
vector of household characteristics, relating to public provision, as in the previous
5The parameter α0 is set equal to the log expenditure of the poorest 1% household in the
sample. Also, the fact that the data used in the empirical analysis come from surveys conducted
in two diﬀerent years (1997, 2003) is taken into account by introducing a dummy variable in αih
and α0h. The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable in α0h is set to 0.2, which is approximately the
cost of living increase between 1997 and 2003.
8section, and f(p,Nh) is a linear, diﬀerentiable and homogenous (of degree one)
function in prices. By diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to lnpi we obtain the budget
share for commodity i
w
T
ih = αih +
P
i
γij lnpj + φ




[lnyh − ah(p) − f(p,Nh)]
2
where φ
i(p,Nh)=∂f(p,Nh)/∂ lnpi.T h e s u p e r s c r i p t T appearing in the cost
function and budget share denotes the case of translating the demand system
(cost function).
To see how translating the demand system relates to scaling the commodity
prices, we combine (2) with (6c)-(6e) and use θih =e x p (
P
s
ξisNsh) − 1 to write
the cost function as
lnC(p,Nh,u h)=ah(p)+ah(Nh)+g(p,Nh)+
bh(p)uh















































The corresponding budget share equations are then given by




























with Asl = Als for all s and l. Assuming that βih = βi and λih = λi and that
αih = αi +
K P
k=0
αikzkh, as in the previous section, the functional form of the cost
function resulting from scaling is identical to that from translating if
P
i
βiξis =0 ,a l ls (14)
9P
i










γijξisξjl = Asl,a l ls and l (14c)
P
j
γjiξjl = Eis,a l li and s.( 1 4 d )
Imposing the restrictions (14)-(14d) on the scaled budget share equations (12) we
obtain the translated ones in (10) for the form of f(p,Nh) deﬁned by (13).6
In the absence of price variation and with health care (i = M)b e i n gt h eo n l y
publicly provided private good in the system the share equation is given by
w
T
ih = αih +
P
s
EisNsh + βih[lnyh − α0h − fh] (15)











In estimation we use Eis =0except for s =1and fh =
3 P
s=1
AsNsh,t h u s
w
T
ih = αih + Ei1N1h + βi[lnyh − α0h − fh]+λi[lnyh − α0h − fh]
2 (16)
where βih = βi, λih = λi and fh is given by the two alternative deﬁnitions of N1h,
N2h and N3h given in (7a) and (7b). The system (16) is estimated by nonlinear
SUR under integrability restriction and the restriction Ei1 = E for all i except
i = M.
Clearly, translating results in a simpler empirical speciﬁcation than scaling,
as no second order eﬀects of public supplementation (Asl =0 ,a l ls and l)a r e
included in the estimated budget share equations.7
6Note that while the scaled and translated demand systems are observationally equivalent,
as implied by the reparameterisations (14)-(14d), they do not necessarily intergate to the same
cost function implying that the two speciﬁcations can have diﬀerent welfare implications.
7As in the scaling model, the parameter α01 is set to 0.3 and α0 is set equal to the log
expenditure of the household at the lowest 1% in the sample. The translating model is estimated
under the restriction that the demographic substitution eﬀect of rh is the same for all commodity
groups, except for health care.
104 Empirical results
We calculate the eﬀects of free of charge public provision of health care and how
these vary with the age of household head and the level of household income8 using
data drawn from the Cyprus Household Budget Surveys of 1997 and 2003. Cyprus,
like many non-western countries, does not have a universal National Health Ser-
vice, although a large proportion of the population has free access to public health
care.9 Nevertheless, public health services are poorly organised and of low quality
(especially at primary level) so that most (if not all) households in the country
supplement to a lesser or greater extent the freely available public with paid out
of pocket private health care services. As a consequence the private health care
sector in Cyprus is ‘fully developed’ at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary)
and accounts for around 60% of total health care expenditure in the country.
A demand system consisting of six commodity groups (food, clothing-footwear,
health care, electricity-fuel, water-communication-other services, other non-durable
goods) is estimated. The sample consists of two-adult households whose age of
head is between 20 and 60, not self-employed or employer and either does not
have any or has only public/government medical cover (ditto for head’s spouse).
This selection of the sample is made in order to achieve suﬃcient homogeneity in
terms of household composition while maintaining variation in terms of access to
the publicly provided health care.
Below we present results obtained from SUR estimation of the scaling (8) and
translating (16) empirical speciﬁcations when the eﬀects of public supplementation
depend on the age of household head and the level of household income. In each
case we report selected parameters estimates, together with some parameter and
system diagnostics. The remaining parameter estimates of the four models are
shown in the Appendix (Tables A1-A4).
8Income (net of tax) consists of net salary and pension income, social security income (such
as unemployment, sickness, child etc beneﬁts), net income from rent, dividends and interest,
income in kind, houshold own-consumption, imputed rent and pecuniary transfers from other
households. Pecuniary transfers to other households are deducted.
9Entitlement to publicly provided free medical care in Cyprus is to a great extent means-
tested. Free medical care is also provided to civil servants and their families.
114.1 Age eﬀects
Table 1 reports selected parameter estimates (t-ratios in parentheses) obtained
from the scaling model when the eﬀects of public supplementation of health care
depend on head’s age. The linear log expenditure eﬀects are signiﬁcant at 5%
signiﬁcance level, for all commodity groups, except for services. The signiﬁcance of
the quadratic log expenditure coeﬃcient can be inferred from a test of λi =0and
t-ratios show that the quadratic expenditure term is signiﬁcant only for electricity-
fuel and services.
Table 1: Selected parameter estimates and system statistics; head’s age
Scaling Translating
A1 - -0.5767 (-2.91)
A2 - 0.0303 (3.10)
A3 - -0.0004 (-3.15)
βi
Food -0.0988 (-5.19) -0.0995 (-5.43)
Clothing-footwear 0.0356 (2.98) 0.0354 (3.07)
Health care 0.0410 (3.14) 0.0485 (3.70)
Electricity-fuel -0.0377 (-4.52) -0.0380 (-4.71)
Services 0.0147 (0.78) 0.0112 (0.60)
λi
Food -0.0065 (-0.67) -0.0061 (-0.63)
Clothing-footwear -0.0012 (-0.19) -0.0016 (-0.27)
Health care -0.0064 (-0.96) -0.0081 (-1.18)
Electricity-fuel -0.0083 (-1.95) -0.0084 (-1.99)
Services 0.0237 (2.47) 0.0253 (2.58)
ξ1 7.8901 (2.43) -
ξ2 -0.4127 (-2.44) -
ξ3 0.0052 (2.43) -
γiM,a l li except i = M 0.0019 (1.75) -




Health care 0.0744 0.0753
Electricity-fuel 0.0470 0.0470
Services 0.1074 0.1073
Number of observations (N) 711 711
Number of parameters 104 104
Objective*N 3463 3458
The estimates of the scaling parameters (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) are individually signiﬁcant
12at 5% level (Table 1) and jointly signiﬁcant at 1% level (Table 2). The inter-
actions of the scaling parameters with the coeﬃcient of log expenditure in the
health care share equation (βM) are also jointly signiﬁcant at 1% level, indicating
rejection of the independence of base hypothesis - the coeﬃcient of the quadratic
log expenditure term is not household invariant (Pashardes, 1995).
The estimates of γiM, the substitution eﬀects in the health care equation from
changes in the number of household members entitled to free public medical care,
is negative for ages 33-46 and positive otherwise, giving rise to a negative eﬀect
on average. This means that privately purchased and free public health care are
substitutes for age groups at the middle and complements for households at the
low and high ends of the age range 20-60.
The overall savings due to access to free public health care is more complicated
to calculate as it involves the interaction of several parameters. However the
signiﬁcance of ξs (s =1 ,2,3), αMk (k =1 ,...,K)a n dγMMξs (s =1 ,2,3)
suggests that this eﬀect is also signiﬁcant. We shall return to this point in the
next section.10
Table 2: Likelihood ratio tests; head’s age
Scaling
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
ξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3 22.84 (<0.0001)
βMξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3 8.85 (0.0029)
αMk=0 , k =1 ,...K 33.68 (0.0092)
Translating
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
As=0 , s =1 ,2,3 9.70 (0.0213)
We next turn to the interpretation of the parameter estimates from the trans-
lating model for the speciﬁcation relating to head’s age. As in the scaling model,
the linear log expenditure parameters (βi)a r es i g n i ﬁcant (at 1% level) for all
commodity groups except for services. The quadratic log expenditure eﬀect in
the translating model is given by a single parameter, λi, which (in contrast to
the scaling model) is the same for all households. The quadratic log expenditure
eﬀects are found to be signiﬁcant only in electricity-fuel and services equations.
10The estimates of the parameters showing the eﬀect of household and head characteristics
on the intercept of the share equations are shown in the Appendix (Table A1). For example an
additional child in the household increases the share of expenditure on clothing-footwear and
health care by 0.0140 and 0.0106 respectively, and decreases the shares of food and electricity-fuel
by 0.0091 and 0.0155, respectively.
13In the translating model the eﬀect of access to free public health care on
household cost enters the model directly, through the parameter A1,w h i l et h e
parameters A2 and A3 reﬂect the interaction of this eﬀect with head’s age and
age squared. The negative sign and statistical signiﬁcance of A1 suggest that
the number of people in the household entitled to free public health care reduce
household cost in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. The parameters A2 and A3 are
also signiﬁcant (at 1% level) and their positive and negative signs, respectively,
imply that the cost reduction (or, equivalently, the savings from access to free
public health care) is greater for households with heads whose age lies at the tails
of the age range 20-60. Additionally, the parameters A1,A 2 and A3 are jointly
signiﬁcant at 5% level (Table 2). The size and statistical signiﬁcance of this cost
reduction/increase is further investigated in the next sub-section.
The substitution eﬀect of the number of household members with free access
to public health care is insigniﬁcant for all commodity groups11 (Table A2). Esti-
mates of the eﬀects of characteristics on the intercepts of share equations are also
shown in the Appendix (Table A2).
4.2 Income eﬀects
The interpretation of the estimates in Table 3 (t-ratios in parentheses) from the
scaling and translating models, for the speciﬁcation depending on household in-
come, is very similar to that for Table 1. Moreover, the magnitude and signiﬁcance
of the estimated βi and λi on Table 3 is very close to those of the corresponding
estimates for the scaling and translating models in Table 1.
For the scaling model only ξ1 and ξ2 are marginally signiﬁcant at 10% level,
but all scaling parameters are jointly signiﬁcant at 5% (Table 4). The joint signif-
icance though for the income speciﬁcation is weaker than that for the age speciﬁ-
cation. There is evidence that the coeﬃcient of log expenditure squared depends
on household income and the number of household members entitled to free public
health care, as βMξs, s =1 ,2,3, are jointly signiﬁcant (Table 4), invalidating the
independence of base property.
The interaction terms γiMξs, s =1 ,2,3, give the substitution eﬀect for the
11As a result of the parameter restriction on γiM’s and EiM’s, for the scaling and translating
models respectively, and the adding up restriction, the absolute value of t-ratio for the parameters
relating to the substitution eﬀect of rh i st h es a m ei na l ls h a r ee q u a t i o n s .
14commodity group i from changes in the number of household members entitled
to free medical care. For the health care share equation these terms are jointly
signiﬁcant (Appendix, Table A6) and the eﬀect depends on household income.
This suggests that privately purchased and free public health care are substitutes
for age groups in the middle and complements for households in the (low and
high) ends of the age range 20-60.
Table 3: Selected parameter estimates and system statistics; household income
Scaling Translating
A1 - -0.2967 (-2.98)
A2 - 0.4594 (2.94)
A3 - -0.1512 (-2.39)
βi
Food -0.0958 (-4.72) -0.0883 (-4.56)
Clothing-footwear 0.0398 (3.11) 0.0419 (3.43)
Health care 0.0396 (2.75) 0.0399 (2.90)
Electricity-fuel -0.0347 (-3.83) -0.0341 (-3.97)
Services 0.0092 (0.45) -0.0006 (-0.03)
λi
Food -0.0087 (-0.81) -0.0124 (-1.17)
Clothing-footwear -0.0037 (-0.55) -0.0055 (-0.83)
Health care -0.0057 (-0.75) -0.0039 (-0.53)
Electricity-fuel -0.0105 (-2.19) -0.0109 (-2.33)
Services 0.0280 (2.62) 0.0331 (3.10)
ξ1 2.2893 (1.73) -
ξ2 -3.3779 (-1.67) -
ξ3 1.1427 (1.50) -
γiM,a l li except i = M 0.0022 (1.17) -




Health care 0.0750 0.0755
Electricity-fuel 0.0471 0.0470
Services 0.1074 0.1072
Number of observations (N) 711 711
Number of parameters 104
Objective*N 3452 3453
The parameters A1, A2 and A3 show the reduction in household expenditure
from the entitlement of household members to the free (or reduced rate) use of
the publicly provided good and its interaction with household income and income
squared. The parameter estimates point to a cost reduction from public provision
for very low and very high income households, more precisely, for households
15belonging to the lowest three and the highest deciles of net income distribution.
Again, a more extensive exploration of the income eﬀect follows in the next section.
Table 4: Likelihood ratio tests; household income
Scaling
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
ξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3 9.73 (0.0210)
βMξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3 7.04 (0.0080)
αMk=0 , k =1 ,...K 21.39 (0.2094)
Translating
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
As=0 , s =1 ,2,3 8.73 (0.0332)
4.3 Choosing between alternative speciﬁcations
To test which variable, head’s age or household income is more informative in
modelling public provision of private goods, models that include both variables are
estimated and the signiﬁcance of the two alternative sets of variables is tested. In
particular the scaling model is estimated for φh = ξ1rh+ξ2rhz1h+ξ3rhz2
1h+ξ4rhb yh+
ξ5rhb y2
h and the translating model for fh = A1rh + A2rhz1h + A3rhz2
1h + A4rhb yh +
A5rhb y2
h. The signiﬁcance of head’s age (household income) and its square, as they
appear in the expressions above, is tested both in the scaling and translating
model. The results of likelihood ratio tests are shown on Table 5.
Table 5: Likelihood ratio tests, head’s age vs household income
Scaling
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
ξs=0 , s =2 ,3 17.11 (0.0002)
ξs=0 , s =4 ,5 4.98 (0.0831)
Translating
Null hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
As=0 , s =2 ,3 7.99 (0.0184)
As=0 , s =4 ,5 6.94 (0.0311)
In the scaling model the hypothesis that the cost reduction from access to
free public health care does not vary with age (the eﬀects of age and age square)
is clearly rejected. In the translating model the same hypothesis is rejected at
5% level but not at 1% level. On the contrary, the hypothesis that the cost
reduction from access to free public health care does not vary with income (the
eﬀects of income and income square) is not rejected in the scaling model at 5%.
The translating model gives somehow more ambiguous results as both hypotheses
16can be rejected at 5% level, but neither can be rejected at 1%. Tests results give
overall lower values for the likelihood ratio statistic (higher p-values), when the
coeﬃcients of household income and its square are tested against zero, in both the
scaling and the translating models. This can be loosely interpreted as evidence in
favour of the speciﬁcation allowing the cost reduction from access to free public
health care to vary with age rather than income.
Since scaling and translating the original demand system results in two non-
nested models it is investigated which model, is more favoured by the data using
a non-nested test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1982; Manera and McAleer, 2005).
As the empirical evidence in favour of/against the age or income variables is not
very clear, non-nested tests are conducted for models that include either the age
or income variables. The results of the tests are shown on Table 6.
Table 6: Non-nested tests
Age variables Income variables
Wald statistic t-statistic Wald statistic t-statistic
Null hypothesis (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Scaling 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(1.0000) (0.2210) 1.0000 (0.5123)
Translating 0.19 0.42 0.03 0.00
(0.9999) (0.6736) 1.0000 0.5828
The null hypothesis that corresponds to the scaling (translating) model corre-
sponds to the restriction that the coeﬃcients of the ﬁtted values from the trans-
lating (scaling) model are all zero in all share equations estimated using the scal-
ing (translating) model. In one instance the coeﬃcients of the ﬁtted values are
allowed to diﬀer in each share equation thus a Wald statistic for their joint sig-
niﬁcance is computed. Alternatively a single coeﬃcient is estimated, the same
for all share equations hence a t-statistic is reported to test for its signiﬁcance.
Test results from both Wald and t-tests are inconclusive, as neither model can
be rejected against the other. One possibility is that both models ﬁt the data
equally well, since they are very similar and essentially diﬀer only in higher order
terms. Another possibility is that the particular data set does not provide enough
information in choosing between the two models.
175 Welfare implications
The empirical results discussed in the previous section, have found entitlement to
free public health care in a household to have an age or income dependant eﬀect
on consumer behaviour. To evaluate the welfare implications of these empirical
ﬁndings in the case of the scaling model we compute the expenditure required by
a household (with at least one member) entitled to free public medical care to
reach the same level of utility as the (reference) household whose members are




h0 = α0h + ah(θh) − α00 − a0(θ0)=−αNhφh +0 .5γMMφ
2
h. (13)
This index can be seen as a measure of the compensation required by household
h so that its members forego entitlement to free public health care.
For the model where public provision is introduced via translating, the corre-
sponding expenditure index is given by
lnI
T
h0 = α0h + fh − α00 − f0 = α0h + fh. (14)
Both indices, IS
h0 and IT
h0, are computed for the deﬁnitions of Nsh variables given
in (7a) and (7b), yielding results where the welfare implications vary with age and
income.
5.1 Variation with age
Figures 1 and 2 show the log cost (expenditure) reduction from access to free or at
reduced charge public medical care by one household member, as estimated from
the scaling and translating model respectively. The estimated indices12 reported
in Figures 1 and 2, whose corresponding functional forms are given in equations
(13) and (14), are estimated for every h e a d ’ sa g ei nt h er a n g e2 0 - 6 0 .T h eu p p e r
and lower endpoints of 90% conﬁdence intervals are also shown, indicating the
ages for which the log expenditure reduction is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
I tc a nb es e e nf r o mF i g u r e1t h a tl o gc o s tr e d u c t i o ni ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (at 10% level) for head’s age 20-27, whereas for the remaining ages
12The index in Figure 1 is computed at the sample averages of the variables in αMh (except
for head’s age) for the case where one household member is entitled to free or at reduced charge
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Figure 1: Log cost reduction by age of household head; scaling
cost reduction is not so diﬀerent. For example, a household whose head is 20
years old and one of its members has access to free public health care, has a
log cost reduction equal to 0.1, which means that the household faces 10% lower
expenditure than a household with the same characteristics except for the free
access to the publicly provided private good. For ages 32-47 entitlement to free
public medical care appears to be associated with higher expenditure (compared
to household without such entitlement), however, this rather odd ﬁnding can be
dismissed as statistically insigniﬁcant and can be attributed to the quadratic mod-
elling (inverted U-shape) of the age eﬀect. From Figure 1 it can be inferred that
for households with heads aged 28-31 and 48-60 the beneﬁt from their entitlement
to free public health care is also insigniﬁcant, whereas for households with heads
aged 20-27 this beneﬁti ss i g n i ﬁcant.
Figure 2 follows a similar pattern to Figure 1, showing that cost reduction from
entitlement to free public health care is experienced by households whose head’s
age lies in the tails of the age range 20-60. In particular the log cost reduction is
statistically diﬀerent from zero (at 10% level) for households with heads aged 20-
23 and 59-60. For example, a household with one member entitled to free public
health care and whose head is 20 years old has about 13% lower expenditure than
a household with the same characteristics except for the entitlement to free public
medical care. For ages 31-50 the model estimates an increase in expenditure, which
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Figure 2: Log cost reduction by age of household head; translating
be a small cost reduction (beneﬁt) from entitlement to free public medical care,
nevertheless not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
From Figures 1 and 2 we can conclude that the two models13 give similar
results namely that households with very young heads beneﬁts i g n i ﬁcantly from
entitlement to free medical care. The translating model results into more extreme
values for cost reduction than the scaling model, therefore larger beneﬁt for house-
holds with younger and also for older heads. The average log cost reduction (over
all ages) estimated from the two models is 0.016 and 0.017 for the scaling and
translating model respectively. Hence, the empirical ﬁnding from both models
converge to the conclusion that for each member entitled to free public health
care households enjoy, on average, a reduction of around 1.5% to 2% in their total
consumption expenditure.
13Both scaling and translating models were also estimated using three stage least squares
(3SLS) to account for possible endogeneity of total expenditure. In the case of the translating
model the results from 3SLS estimation are similar to those from SUR estimation. In the case
of the scaling model the marginally signiﬁcant λ’s for electricity-fuel and services obtained from
SUR estimation become insigniﬁcant when 3SLS estimation is applied, thus giving less precise
estimates of the demographic costs (Pashardes, 1995) and consequently insigniﬁcant estimates
for the cost reduction from access to free public health care. The pattern however, where beneﬁt
appears to be larger for households with heads whose age lies closer to the end points of the age
interval 20-60, is maintained. The results of 3SLS estimation are available on request.
205.2 Variation with income
Below it is investigated whether variation with age, of cost reduction from the
entitlement to free public health care might simply be capturing the eﬀect of
income, as income tends to be lower for households with very young or older
(mainly pensioners) heads, therefore such households are expected to beneﬁtm o r e
from public provision. Thus we use deﬁnition (7b) in calculating the log cost
indices (13) and (14).
Figures 3 and 4 show the log cost reduction estimated using (13)14 and (14),
respectively, from the entitlement to the free access to public health care services
by one household member, for diﬀerent deciles of household net income. The
deciles are shown on the graphs in ascending order, thus 1 and 10 corresponds
to the 10% of households in the sample with the lowest and highest average b yh,
respectively; and (13) and (14) are computed at the average b yh in each decile. To
indicate the deciles for which log cost reduction is statistically diﬀerent from zero,
the upper and lower endpoints of 90% conﬁdence intervals are also presented in
the graphs.
Figure 3 shows that for all deciles log cost reduction is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero even though it tends to be larger for the lower (1st and 2nd) and higher
(9th and 10th) deciles. On the other hand Figure 4 shows that there is, to some
extent, variation of the beneﬁt from free access to public health care services with
net income, as cost reduction is statistically diﬀerent from zero for the lowest
deciles (1st and 2nd) of net income. For example, for the poorest households
(i.e. those belonging in the 1st decile), entitlement to free public medical care
by one member of the household reduces cost by 13%, compared to a household
belonging to the same decile but without such entitlement. Households in higher
deciles (7th, 8th and 9th) seem to experience a small increase in total expenditure
due to entitlement to free use of public health care services, a paradoxical result
even though statistically signiﬁcant only at 10% level.
From Figures 1-4 and the tests’ outcomes of Table 5, it emerges that the
age of household head seems to be a more appropriate characteristic associated
w i t hv a r i a t i o ni nt h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of free access to public health care among
households in Cyprus.
14Analogously to the index in Figure 1, the index in Figure 3 is computed at the sample
averages of the variables in αMh (except for b yh) for the case where one household member is
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Figure 4: Log cost reduction by decile of household net income; translating
226 Summary and conclusion
The techniques for evaluating the welfare eﬀects of public (minimarket) goods are
well-developed in the literature and include both revealed (e.g. hedonic models)
and stated (e.g. contingent valuation) preference methods. This paper proposes
a revealed preference approach to estimating consumer welfare from free access
to publicly provided private goods, using demand analysis and readily available
data.
Public provision of private goods is studied in the context of an integrable
rank-3 demand system where publicly provided private goods (such as health
care) are simultaneously available at the private market and eligible households
can consume either the publicly provided good, buy it from the private sector or
consume a combination of the two, assuming that the public provision scheme
(e.g. health care system) allows supplementation.
Access to publicly provided private goods is introduced in the demand system
as a scaling in the price of the corresponding private good, with the scaling pa-
rameter being a function of income or the age of household head. Thus, scaling
allows public supplementation to operate as a price subsidy for the private good.
This relationship arises from the assumption that the publicly provided private
good is an aﬃne transformation of the private good. We examine the welfare
implications of free access to a publicly provided private good by comparing the
cost required to attain the same utility level by households without and with such
access. The welfare measure used in this paper does not include the positive
externalities associated with the free access to public health care.
An empirical investigation is provided for the case of health care services in
Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and also those entitled to it
often supplement their consumption with purchases from the private health sector.
The price scaling associated with free access to public health services is modelled
as a function of the age of head and income of the household. Furthermore, in
the empirical analysis the eﬀect of free public provision on household cost is also
investigated using an alternative empirical speciﬁcation known in the literature
as translating. Although not having a meaningful theoretical interpretation in
the context of our analysis, translating can be a useful benchmark for comparison
with scaling because the two models are observationally very close to each other.
The results of our empirical analysis show that the entitlement to free public
23health care beneﬁts mostly households with younger heads (less than 27 years old)
and, to a lesser extent, households with heads aged 28-31 and 48-60 face reductions
of much smaller magnitude. Some evidence associating access to free public health
care provision with reduction in cost is found for households with low income. On
average the beneﬁt from the entitlement of one household member to free public
medical care is estimated to be around 2% of total household expenditure.
The conclusion emerging from our analysis is that among households entitled
to free access to public health care services only those with very young or older
head and/or low income beneﬁt from it. This probably reﬂects the low quality
of the public health care services in Cyprus, including queuing and bureaucratic
inconvenience. While this conclusion is somewhat confounded by inadequacy in
the number of observations and other data limitations (e.g. lack of price variation)
we believe that the modelling approach proposed in this paper can be useful in
investigating behavioural and welfare implications of free public health care. The
same approach can also be used in investigating behavioural and welfare eﬀects
of education, day care and other publicly provided private goods.
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26Appendix
Table A1: Scaling; head’s age
Variable Food Cloth. Health Electr. Serv.
Constant 0.4525 0.0631 0.1368 0.1522 0.0894
(7.39) (1.62) (3.30) (5.52) (1.42)
Survey -0.0240 -0.0144 0.0063 0.0339 -0.0017
(-2.83) (-2.70) (1.02) (8.97) (-0.20)
Household characteristics
Number of children -0.0091 0.0140 0.0106 -0.0155 -0.0084
(-1.69) (4.20) (2.70) (-6.48) (-1.59)
Number of rooms -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0031 -0.0003
(-0.30) (-0.64) (-0.81) (2.06) (-0.08)
Number of cars -0.0309 -0.0038 -0.0044 0.0211 0.0256
(-3.97) (-0.77) (-0.83) (6.16) (3.25)
Central heating 0.0050 0.0025 -0.0065 0.0153 -0.0129
(0.49) (0.39) (-0.94) (3.45) (-1.28)
Head’s characteristics
Age 0.0033 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0004
(6.37) (-1.13) (-2.31) (-1.38) (-0.79)
Private sector employee 0.0083 -0.0114 0.0103 -0.0094 0.0159
(0.80) (-1.75) (1.44) (-2.07) (1.53)
Elementary education-not completed -0.0611 -0.0021 -0.0395 -0.0114 0.1263
(-1.16) (-0.06) (-1.16) (-0.48) (2.30)
Elementary education -0.0897 0.0119 -0.0306 -0.0155 0.1405
(-1.82) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.70) (2.72)
Lower secondary education -0.0986 0.0130 -0.0306 -0.0180 0.1572
(-1.94) (0.40) (-1.09) (-0.78) (2.96)
Upper secondary education -0.1188 0.0164 -0.0469 -0.0200 0.1741
(-2.38) (0.51) (-1.45) (-0.88) (3.33)
College -0.0976 0.0183 -0.0532 -0.0180 0.1620
(-1.89) (0.55) (-1.58) (-0.77) (3.01)
University -0.1346 0.0121 -0.0499 -0.0252 0.2009
(-2.64) (0.37) (-1.50) (-1.09) (3.77)
Employed -0.0324 0.0312 0.0186 -0.0016 0.0017
(-1.86) (2.80) (1.58) (-0.21) (0.10)
Unemployed -0.0160 0.0223 -0.0219 0.0049 0.0130
(-0.64) (1.41) (-1.30) (0.45) (0.52)
Housewife -0.0112 0.0279 -0.0232 0.0089 -0.0245
(-0.30) (1.17) (-0.91) (0.54) (-0.65)
Chronically ill/disable -0.0078 0.0151 0.0177 -0.0308 -0.0044
(-0.30) (0.91) (1.02) (-2.69) (-0.17)
27Table A2: Translating; head’s age
Variable Food Cloth. Health Electr. Serv.
Constant 0.4363 0.0620 0.1565 0.1416 0.0968
(7.01) (1.61) (3.63) (5.16) (1.57)
Survey -0.0229 -0.0152 0.0074 0.0341 -0.0023
(-2.59) (-2.74) (1.11) (8.66) (-0.24)
Household characteristics
Number of children -0.0099 0.0158 0.0065 -0.0153 -0.0071
(-1.80) (4.59) (1.63) (-6.28) (-1.26)
Public medical cover (no. of members) -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0004
(-0.72) (-0.72) (0.72) (-0.72) (-0.72)
Number of rooms -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0031 -0.0005
(-0.31) (-0.73) (-0.53) (2.06) (-0.15)
Number of cars -0.0306 -0.0032 -0.0073 0.0215 0.0262
(-3.92) (-0.65) (-1.33) (6.28) (3.36)
Central heating 0.0052 0.0025 -0.0074 0.0152 -0.0125
(0.52) (0.40) (-1.04) (3.44) (-1.23)
Head’s characteristics
Age 0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0005
(5.64) (-1.27) (-2.50) (-1.25) (-0.90)
Private sector employee 0.0083 -0.0119 0.0122 -0.0092 0.0149
(0.80) (-1.82) (1.65) (-2.00) (1.41)
Elementary education-not completed -0.0450 -0.0006 -0.0638 -0.0027 0.1236
(0.85) (-0.02) (-1.72) (-0.11) (2.33)
Elementary education -0.0754 0.0148 -0.0566 -0.0070 0.1387
(-1.52) (0.47) (-1.63) (-0.32) (2.79)
Lower secondary education -0.0844 0.0151 -0.0597 -0.0094 0.1545
(-1.65) (0.47) (-1.67) (-0.42) (3.01)
Upper secondary education -0.1041 0.0187 -0.0715 -0.0110 0.1713
(-2.08) (0.59) (-2.03) (-0.50) (3.41)
College -0.0825 0.0207 -0.0789 -0.0088 0.1593
(-1.59) (0.64) (-2.18) (-0.39) (3.07)
University -0.1198 0.0152 -0.0776 -0.0160 0.1990
(-2.34) (0.47) (-2.16) (-0.71) (3.88)
Employed -0.0336 0.0320 -0.0193 -0.0013 0.0017
(-1.91) (2.90) (-1.57) (-0.17) (0.09)
Unemployed -0.0168 0.0230 -0.0222 0.0055 0.0122
(-0.67) (1.47) (-1.27) (0.50) (0.49)
Housewife -0.0123 0.0289 -0.0245 0.0101 -0.0254
(-0.33) (1.22) (-0.93) (0.61) (-0.67)
Chronically ill/disable -0.0133 0.0174 0.0172 -0.0335 -0.0009
(-0.51) (1.06) (0.94) (-2.92) (-0.03)
28Table A3: Scaling; household income
Variable Food Cloth. Health Electr. Serv.
Constant 0.3751 0.0592 0.0599 0.1332 0.2818
(7.15) (1.76) (1.58) (5.57) (5.24)
Survey -0.0191 -0.0135 0.0132 0.0358 -0.0176
(-1.69) (-1.89) (1.55) (6.88) (-1.54)
Household characteristics
Number of children -0.0005 0.0148 0.0083 -0.0114 -0.0208
(-0.07) (3.12) (1.62) (-3.31) (-2.70)
Number of rooms 0.0200 0.0013 0.0220 0.0114 -0.0619
(0.70) (0.07) (1.14) (0.86) (-2.08)
Number of cars 0.0184 0.0024 0.0453 0.0404 -0.1119
(0.29) (0.06) (1.08) (1.39) (-1.70)
Central heating 0.0569 0.0092 0.0488 0.0356 -0.1613
(0.83) (0.21) (1.06) (1.13) (-2.27)
Household net income -0.2592 -0.0330 -0.2541 -0.1032 0.7176
(-0.79) (-0.16) (-1.16) (-0.68) (2.11)
Head’s characteristics
Age 0.0034 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0008
(6.84) (-1.19) (-2.22) (-1.35) (-1.55)
Private sector employee -0.0212 -0.0153 -0.0226 -0.0207 0.1015
(-0.53) (-0.60) (-0.83) (-1.12) (2.43)
Elementary education -0.0285 0.0150 0.0049 -0.0023 0.0152
(-1.26) (1.03) (0.31) (-0.23) (0.65)
Lower secondary education -0.0194 0.0180 0.0254 0.0021 -0.0258
(-0.46) (0.37) (0.89) (0.11) (-0.60)
Upper secondary education -0.0220 0.0239 0.0339 0.0071 -0.0604
(-0.36) (0.61) (0.81) (0.25) (-0.95)
College 0.0098 0.0267 0.0328 0.0135 -0.0956
(0.14) (0.57) (0.67) (0.40) (-1.27)
University 0.0284 0.0281 0.0857 0.0290 -0.2067
(0.20) (0.32) (0.92) (0.45) (-1.43)
Employed 0.0430 0.0406 0.0684 0.0280 -0.2202
(0.43) (0.63) (1.03) (0.61) (-2.11)
Unemployed 0.0161 0.0263 0.0123 0.0180 -0.0789
(0.35) (0.88) (0.39) (0.84) (-1.62)
Housewife 0.0025 0.0300 -0.0182 0.0165 -0.0561
(0.06) (1.18) (-0.67) (0.93) (-1.39)
Chronically ill/disable -0.0186 0.0132 -0.0166 -0.0335 -0.0496
(-0.51) (0.56) (-0.66) (-2.02) (-1.31)
29Table A4: Translating; household income
Variable Food Cloth. Health Electr. Serv.
Constant 0.3843 0.0553 0.0511 0.1365 0.2858
(7.04) (1.62) (1.30) (5.62) (5.15)
Survey -0.0175 -0.0151 0.0177 0.0362 -0.0210
(-1.47) (-2.01) (1.94) (6.74) (-1.65)
Household characteristics
Number of children -0.0016 0.0144 0.0116 -0.0120 -0.0214
(-0.21) (3.06) (2.20) (-3.59) (-2.84)
Public medical cover (no. of members) -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0005
(-1.00) (-1.00) (1.00) (-1.00) (-1.00)
Number of rooms 0.0185 -0.0018 0.0351 0.0102 -0.0664
(0.64) (-0.10) (1.69) (0.79) (-2.25)
Number of cars 0.0131 -0.0037 -0.0739 0.0372 -0.1207
(0.20) (-0.09) (1.62) (1.31) (-1.86)
Central heating 0.0530 0.0019 0.0800 0.0326 -0.1718
(0.76) (0.04) (1.61) (1.05) (-2.44)
Household net income -0.2491 0.0087 -0.4152 -0.0914 0.7760
(-0.75) (0.04) (-1.75) (-0.62) (2.30)
Head’s characteristics
Age 0.0035 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0007
(6.92) (-1.35) (-1.99) (-1.25) (-1.70)
Private sector employee -0.0179 -0.0119 -0.0378 -0.0184 0.1049
(-0.44) (-0.47) (-1.31) (-1.01) (2.55)
Elementary education -0.0316 0.0153 0.0085 -0.0032 0.0148
(-1.37) (1.06) (0.52) (-0.32) (0.64)
Lower secondary education -0.0248 0.0162 0.0399 -0.0008 -0.0299
(-0.58) (0.60) (1.31) (-0.00) (-0.69)
Upper secondary education -0.0288 0.0201 0.0585 0.0039 -0.0680
(-0.46) (0.51) (1.30) (0.14) (-1.07)
College 0.0025 0.0207 0.0638 0.0097 -0.1047
(0.03) (0.45) (1.21) (0.29) (-1.40)
University 0.0199 0.0135 0.1510 0.0230 -0.2296
(0.14) (0.15) (1.49) (0.37) (-1.60)
Employed 0.0345 0.0313 0.1104 0.0226 -0.2324
(0.34) (0.50) (1.52) (0.50) (-2.25)
Unemployed 0.0117 0.0230 0.0307 0.0157 -0.0844
(0.25) (0.77) (0.90) (0.74) (-1.75)
Housewife 0.0037 0.0269 -0.0087 0.0172 -0.0613
(0.09) (1.07) (-0.31) (0.97) (-1.52)
Chronically ill/disable -0.0155 0.0123 -0.0206 -0.0330 0.0522
(-0.41) (0.52) (-0.76) (-1.97) (1.37)
30Table A5: Likelihood ratio tests (Scaling; head’s age)
Hypothesis LR statistic and p-value
γMMξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3 22.84 (<0.0001)
γMMξ1=0 20.86 (<0.0001)
γMMξ2 =0 22.19 (<0.0001)
γMMξ3=0 22.40 (<0.0001)
Note: the inference about γiMξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3, i 6= M follows from the outcomes
in the table as the model is estimated under the restriction γMM= −5γiM.
Table A6: Likelihood ratio tests (Scaling; household income)
Hypothesis LR statistic and p-value




Note: the inference about γiMξs=0 , s =1 ,2,3, i 6= M follows from the outcomes
in the table as the model is estimated under the restriction γMM= −5γiM.
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